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ABSTRACT
! e model of deliberative democracy poses a number of di"  cult questions about 
individual rationality, public reason and justi# cation, public spiritedness, and an active 
and supportive public sphere. It also raises the question about what kind of civic 
involvement is required for the practices of democratic deliberation to be e$ ective. 
! e aim of this article is to examine the last question by looking at the role and value 
of citizenship understood in terms of participation. It argues that deliberative democ-
racy implies a category of democratic citizens; its institutional framework calls for the 
activity and competence of citizenry, and consequently, the participatory forms of 
deliberative democracy come closest to the democratic ideal as such. Also, the model 
of participatory-deliberative democracy is more attractive as a truly democratic ideal 
than the model of formal deliberative democracy, but it certainly faces more di"  cul-
ties when it comes to the practicalities, and especially the institutional design. ! is 
problem is raised in the last section of the article where the possible applicability of 
such a model to post-communist democracies is addressed. ! e major di"  culty that 
the participatory-deliberative model poses for the post-communist democratization 
can be explained by a reference to the cultural approach towards democratization and 
to the revised modernization theory presented by Inglehart and Welzel. ! e problem 
of the applicability of such a model in the post-communist context seems to support 
the thesis presented here which suggests that active citizenship, civic skills and civic 
culture are indispensable for the development of deliberative politics. 
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MODELS OF DEMOCRACY 
  ere are two dominant and competing theories of democracy today: the theory 
of liberal democracy (o" en described as procedural or “aggregative” democracy) 
advocated by Schumpeter, Dahl, Sartori, Riker, and others, and the participatory, 
deliberative, and republican models, sometimes described as “classical” models.  e 
liberal-democratic models (elitism, pluralism) are descriptive-explanatory accounts 
of democratic politics and have realistic and objective goal. What is crucial to their 
approach to democracy is the role of various constitutional arrangements and rules 
in assuring fair competition among political leaders and the continuity of the regime. 
But one cannot deny that there are some normative assumptions about desirable 
democratic institutions and practices that these models presume. 
Participatory, deliberative, and republican models of democracy are normative 
models within democratic theory; they o# er an ideal view of democratic politics and 
democratic society and thus have prescriptive character. Arguably, the central role 
of participation is one of the main aspects of the normative democratic theory which 
distinguishes it from the theory of liberal democracy. Consequently, these three 
models – deliberative, participatory, and republican democracy – do not constitute 
separate democratic theories1 since they all represent an attempt to overcome de$ -
ciencies of the liberal democratic theory: its formal, procedural character, and the 
view of the individual as a maximizer of his or her own expected preference-satisfac-
tion.  ey also reject the concept of democratic politics understood in terms of fair 
bargaining among groups who pursue their own particular interests, and they are 
normative and not descriptive approaches to democracy. Moreover, they concern 
themselves with democratic politics which is, at least partly, shaped by citizens 
exercising their political rights, and they endorse a richer understanding of legitimacy 
and the decision-making process than the liberal democratic theory. Despite these 
obvious similarities, there are important di# erences between the three approaches, 
and there are signi$ cant di# erences within them.  e starting point of the concept 
of deliberative democracy is a disa# ection with the too limited vision of democracy 
that dominated political theory in the twentieth century, and instead the attempts 
to bring to the fore the issues of democratic deliberation and legitimacy. It focuses 
on the procedure of ideal deliberation that aims at a rationally motivated consensus2 
  e participatory model puts emphasis on the value and importance of citizens’ 
1 Por. F. Cunningham, ! eories of Democracy: A Critical Introduction, London and New 
York: Routledge, 2002.
2 J. Cohen, ‘Deliberation and Democratic Legitimacy’, in: D. Estlund (ed.), Democracy, 
Oxford: Blackwell, p. 93.
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participation in the decision-making process at both local and national level, whereas 
the model in! uenced by the revival of republicanism stresses the role of such repub-
lican ideals as civic virtue and responsible citizenship in making democracy a more 
desirable and more substantive ideal. But since these three approaches seem to have 
more in common than it is usually assumed, I prefer to call them “models” within 
normative democratic theory and not “theories”. Consequently, I will try to examine 
whether the concept of deliberative democracy can be elaborated in more participa-
tory terms as found in the other two models. In order to do that, I will " rst try to 
establish what concept of citizenship would be supportive of the ideal of deliberative 
democracy. Secondly, I will try to answer the question “who should deliberate?” in 
a more participatory way. # irdly, I will argue that a more participatory deliberative 
democracy does not presuppose direct democracy, but can be reconciled with a 
representative model. # e main thesis of this article is that the model of participatory 
deliberative democracy is more attractive as a truly democratic ideal than the model 
of formal deliberative democracy, but it certainly faces more di$  culties when it 
comes to practicalities, and especially the institutional design. # is problem will be 
raised in the last section of the paper where the possible applicability of such a model 
to post-communist democracies is discussed.
DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY AND THE IDEAL OF CITIZENSHIP
Deliberative democrats criticize the mechanisms of “aggregative democracy” that 
base collective decisions simply on the aggregation of votes which express the " xed 
preferences of citizens. # ey suggest that in order to improve the democratic process 
of decision-making, reasons not votes should be the most important factor. # e 
concept of deliberative democracy has found its most powerful proponent in Jürgen 
Habermas whose theory of communicative action and discourse ethics paved the 
way for the idea of deliberation as a worthwhile mechanism for generating consen-
sus.3 It is also a way of dealing with con! ict and di& erence on the basis of mutual 
recognition, reciprocity, and “a commitment to communicative rationality.”4 Such 
rationality facilitates cooperation among participants and enhances the problem-
solving and reason-giving competence of individuals. Public deliberation then is “the 
3 J. Habermas, Between Facts and Norms: Contributions to a Discourse ! eory of Law and 
Democracy, tr. W. Rheg., Cambridge MA: MIT Press, 1996, p. 287–328.
4 J. Dryzek, Discursive Democracy: Politics, Policy, and Political Science, Cambridge: Cam-
bridge University Press, p. 18. 
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way in which the practical reasoning of agents enters into political decision making.”5 
It is a test for democratic legitimacy. But what do we really talk about when we talk 
about deliberative democracy? Most deliberative democrats would probably agree 
that we talk about a speci! c democratic ideal.6 It seems inevitable that such an ideal 
has to be supported by some other ideals; the very fact that it is an ideal limits any 
more empirical exposition of its functioning. " e problem arises when we try to 
develop its practical side, and speci! cally when we try to establish who – according 
to deliberative democrats – is to deliberate and how deliberation is supposed to 
in# uence the decision-making process. I argue that the practical side of the ideal of 
deliberative democracy is the practice of citizenship and a representative form of 
government. " e practice of citizenship can again be constructed as an ideal, or, to 
put it di$ erently, as a desirable practice that supports democracy. As the issue of 
citizenship is too complex to be fully addressed here, in the next section I will try to 
identify a concept of citizenship that can be seen as supportive of a deliberative 
democracy. 
FOUR CONCEPTS OF CITIZENSHIP
Citizenship can be understood in terms of active and passive rights and duties 
that members of a given polity have been guaranteed by its constitution. Among 
them are social, political, and economic rights and freedoms, which can be exercised 
as long as the equal rights of others are respected. Being a citizen according to this 
view, call it liberal, does not presuppose an active exercise of available rights, but 
merely their equal availability to all adult members of the polity. Citizenship is then 
purely a legal status by virtue of being born and living within some territory. It is a 
status which brings certain civil, political, and social rights. In T. H. Marshall’s con-
cept of modern citizenship, understood in terms of the recognition of certain rights, 
a citizen is viewed as, above all, a bearer of rights whose main duty is to obey the 
5 J. Bohman, Public Deliberation: Pluralism, Complexity, and Democracy, Cambridge 
MA: MIT Press, 1996, p. 2.
6 " e understanding of democracy that implies perceiving it or some of its forms as an 
ideal is a novel, twentieth century development. Since antiquity democracy has never been 
viewed as tenable as an ideal; on the contrary, it has always been seen as one of the worst 
types of government. Only fairly recently has liberal democracy been given the status of the 
only game (worth playing) in town and has become a good thing (see, for example,I. Hamp-
sher-Monk, ‘" e Historical Study of Democracy’, in Graeme Duncan (ed.), Democratic ! e-
ory and Practice, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983, pp. 25–35.; C.B. Macpher-
son, ! e Real World of Democracy, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1996, p. 1.
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laws.7 ! e view of citizens as free and independent persons that was developed in 
the liberal tradition leaves individuals to themselves and to their own endeavours; 
civil, political, and social rights which are guaranteed in the liberal state, are exercised 
by individuals in the process of their self-realization. 
Many schools of thought in current political theory – neorepublicans, commu-
nitarians, participatory democrats, critics of Rawls’ liberalism et cetera – have criti-
cally addressed the liberal conception of citizenship.8 ! e critique has generally 
focused upon the one-sided, individualistic preoccupation with rights seen as 
“political trumps”, to use Ronald Dworkin’s famous term, and the consequent neglect 
of values such as community, political liberty, and civic responsibilities. Contempo-
rary proponents of republicanism argue that democratic theory is weak with regard 
to the practice of citizenship and the civic-republican tradition is strong in this 
respect.9 Civic republicanism brings to the fore a concept of citizenship focused not 
on individual rights, but on the duties and obligations of citizens to participate in 
the political decision-making process. One of the central ideals in the republican 
understanding of citizenship is civic responsibility for the common good; citizenship 
is viewed as the entire spectrum of activities and one of its main purposes is to secure 
freedom of citizens and to strengthen the republic based on a mixed constitution. 
Republican citizens associate with others and they " nd participation in the public 
life rewarding. It is a view that emphasises citizens’ duties rather then their rights, 
the fact that they understand and recognize their public duties; citizenship is a status 
that has to be earned and it can only be earned by those who take their civic duties 
seriously. Citizenship is “a public vocation” and the practice of citizenship gives 
individuals their real sense of autonomy. ! e republican model of citizenship envis-
ages a population accustomed to political freedom and to respect for the public good. 
Contemporary advocates of civic republicanism usually try to link the liberal concep-
tion of the citizen as a bearer of rights with the republican view of the citizen as 
7 T.H. Marshall, Class, Citizenship and Social Development, New York: Doubleday, 1964.
8 M. Sandel, Liberalism and the Limits of Justice, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1982; M. Sandel, ! e Procedural Republic and the Unencumbered Self ’, “Political ! eory”, Vol. 
12, no. 1, 1986, s. 81-96, ; R.N. Bellah et al, Habits of the Heart: Individualism and Commit-
ment in American Life, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1995; R. Dagger, Civic Virtues: 
Rights, Citizenship, and Republican Liberalism. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997; 
S. Avineri, A. De-Shalit (eds), Communitariansim and Individualism, Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1992.
9 Np. A. Old" eld, Citizenship and Community: Civic Republicanism and the Modern 
World 
London: Routledge, 1990, pp. 156-57; R. Dagger, Civic Virtues…, chaps. 1 and 2; D. Heat-
er, What is Citizenship, Cambridge: Polity Press, 1999, chap. 2.
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a performer of duties.10 While instrumental republicanism sees citizenship as a means 
of preserving individual freedom, rather than as an activity or relationship which 
has signi! cant intrinsic value, strong republicanism emphasises the inherent value 
of participating in self-government and realising certain common goods among 
citizens.
" e communitarian conception of citizenship stresses the cultural solidarity 
within a community of those who share a history or tradition. On this reading, citi-
zenship refers to the membership in a self-determining ethical community and to 
the status of belonging that shapes citizens’ identity. " e communitarian conception 
of politics requires that membership of a political community is a constitutive attach-
ment, and it presupposes participation in self-rule seen as the essence of freedom. 
" e very existence and endurance of political community is secured through such 
constitutive attachments of citizens to the substantive principles, values, and tradi-
tions of their community. 
" e fourth conception of citizenship, known as multicultural citizenship, has now 
been widely discussed by political theorists who address the issues of global justice 
and multiculturalism.11 As presented by Will Kymlicka, multicultural citizenship 
concerns extended minority group rights – from protection for cultural expression 
for ethnic groups to the rights to self-government for national minorities, as well as 
rights to representation and hence political participation for these groups. It also 
provides reasons for the practice of “di# erentiated rights” that should be recognized 
by a liberal state as long as they are not granted to groups whose internal structures 
are illiberal.12 " is new concept of citizenship provides grounds for and legitimizes 
the rights and needs of citizens to maintain commitments both to their cultural 
communities and to the national civic culture. " e transformation of national civic 
culture in the way that it re$ ects and gives voice to the diverse ethnic, religious, racial, 
and language communities that constitute it is necessary to accommodate the needs 
of all of its citizens and to develop their commitments to the nation-state and its 
10 B. Barber, Strong Democracy: Participatory Politics for the New Age (Berkely: Univer-
sity of California Press, 1984; Q. Skinner, ‘" e Republican Ideal of Political Liberty’, in: 
G. Bock et al (eds), Machiavelli and Republicanism, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1990, pp. 293–309.
11 W. Kymlicka, Multicultural Citizenship: A Liberal ! eory of Minority Rights, Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1995; W. Kymlicka, Politics in the Vernacular: Nationalism, Multicultur-
alism and Citizenship, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001; J. M. Delgado-Moreira, Mul-
ticultural Citizenship of the European Union, Aldershot: Ashgate, 2000.
12 Cf. I. Young, Justice and Politics of Di" erence, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
2000, pp. 96–116.
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ideals. ! e major problem that conceptions of multicultural citizenship try to address 
and solve is the problem of di" erence and liberal democracy’s inclusivness. 
None of these conceptions on their own can be seen as a su#  cient and adequate 
precondition for a deliberative democracy, although each of them contains some 
crucial elements that are necessary for deliberative politics to take place. ! e four 
conceptions should then be treated, to a large extent, as being complementary and 
not exclusive. Deliberative democrats address the issue of citizenship indirectly when 
they stress that one of the main conditions of deliberative politics is freedom and 
equality of persons, and respect for persons as moral agents and moral reasoners. 
On this reading, the state reinforces the system of equal rights that govern the inter-
actions between equal citizens and groups of citizens. Furthermore, democratic 
politics which involves public deliberation focused on the common good, not only 
requires formal equality among citizens, but also “shapes the identity and interests of 
citizens in ways that contribute to the formation of a public conception of common 
good”.13 Arguably, the liberal conception of citizenship is too narrow for any meaning-
ful idea of deliberative practices, but it presupposes the necessary institutional 
framework that any meaningful conception of democratic citizenship needs to 
involve. 
 Deliberative democrats agree that the democratic model they advocate is 
a “pluralistic association” which, in accordance with Rawls’s concept of political 
liberalism, is not grounded on any comprehensive moral theory, but on the fact of 
reasonable pluralism. Members of such association have di" erent views, preferences, 
convictions and ideals as well as con$ icting aims. For this reason, it can be argued 
that deliberative democracy cannot be based on the communitarian conception of 
citizenship, but rather on the conception of multicultural citizenship. On the other 
hand, democratic deliberation would not be possible without some grass-roots shared 
values and principles of a political community, as well as without some collective 
identities, which are crucial for its existence. Also, deliberative democracy can hardly 
be based on the civic republican view of citizenship with its strong emphasis on 
public duties.14 But it certainly shares the central element of the participatory concept 
of citizenship which is endorsed here, namely the value of active citizenship. Similarly, 
multicultural citizenship provides a good starting point for the discussion on the 
13 J. Cohen, ‘Deliberation and Democratic Legitimacy’, p. 89.
14 Some democratic theorists % nd the conception of republican citizenship as the one 
deliberative democracy should rely upon. For example, David Miller suggests that republican 
citizenship is “better able to respond to cultural diversity” than liberal and libertarian mod-
els of citizenship “by virtue of its ability to draw groups who initially have very di" erent 
priorities into public debate, and to % nd compromise solutions to political issues that mem-
bers of each group can accept.” (Miller, 2000, p.3, 53–61).
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scope of public deliberation which needs to incorporate views of various minority 
groups. In multicultural societies, the practice of deliberation seems to be particularly 
desirable, but it also faces a number of challenges such as an equal representation of 
di# erent groups and the development of inclusive participatory civic culture. 
Taking all these crucial elements of each conception of citizenship into consid-
eration, I would like to put forward a conception of citizenship that is understood 
in terms of participation in public life, which is only possible due to constitutionally 
guaranteed equal civil rights, as well as principles that are shared and accepted by all 
citizens, and their sense of political community. O" en this conception of citizenship 
is characterized as “active citizenship” as opposed to citizenship understood as merely 
a legal status. What do we gain with such an understanding of citizenship and why 
should it be associated with deliberative democracy? If deliberation is viewed as 
guided by the preoccupation with the common good then those who are involved 
must be seen as citizens and not just individuals. # e background of deliberative 
democracy is the idea of citizens as free and equal, and the fact of reasonable plural-
ism. Moreover, since deliberative democracy is “a form of political community”15, 
the whole democratic process is an enterprise which involves individuals as citizens 
who are equal members of the sovereign body and who share equal citizenship rights. 
# e very existence and security of equal citizenship rights does in itself contribute 
to $ ourishing democratic deliberation; active citizens’ involvement can only take 
place within the framework of essential norms, rules, and attitudes of a given polity 
and its aim is not to undermine, reshape, or build such norms from scratch. # e 
main task for deliberative democrats is then to prompt citizens to use their political 
judgement on issues of public concern and to develop the capacity of citizenship and 
its supportive virtues: civility and public responsibility. Such a model of citizenship 
is problematic in the context of post-communist democratization, mainly due to 
so-called communist legacy, but even in that context it can be seen as a desirable goal 
of a further democratic change, at least in those countries which have become con-
solidated and e! ective democracies in terms of the protection of civil and political 
rights and democratic accountability of their political elites.
In the next section, it will be explained why deliberative democracy should give 
individuals a real sense of citizenship, that is, of active involvement in the democratic 
process. # e conception of active citizenship does not exclude those who do not want 
to participate or who cannot participate; it only stresses the importance and value 
of the practice of citizenship public rights, among them the right to express one’s 
views in the public forum, the right to associate with others, and the franchise.
15 J. Cohen, ‘Democracy and Liberty’, in: J. Elster (ed.), Deliberative Democracy, Cam-
bridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988, p. 222.
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DELIBERATION AND PARTICIPATION 
  eorists of deliberative democracy tend to focus their attention on the institu-
tionalization of the procedures that facilitate deliberation and thus on formal condi-
tions of communication.16  ey try to identify a set of principles that prescribe fair 
terms of cooperation and hence imply that the success of deliberative politics depends 
above all on the institutional and procedural conditions. Such approach avoids the 
question of feasibility of democratic deliberation understood in terms of real involve-
ment of those who are to deliberate. But if deliberative democrats are to answer the 
question “who is supposed to deliberate?” they will need to do that by addressing 
the issue of participation as well as some speci" c view of the self. A social and dis-
cursive view of the self – as opposed to the view of the self understood in terms of 
self-interests – seems to be a necessary postulate that a model of deliberative democ-
racy should involve. It is a view of human beings as agents, as free and equal persons 
who have deliberative capacities, and of politics as public activity through which 
people manifest their role as citizens. In general, deliberative democracy relies on an 
optimistic concept of a rational self, and it requires high cognitive capacities, and the 
ability to reason and give reasons.17 For our further discussion it is important to 
establish whether there is an obvious linkage between the conception of deliberation 
and the ideal of active civic engagement of free and equal persons. In order to do 
that we need to look at various ways of conceptualising deliberation. 
APPROACHES TO DELIBERATION
Procedural or formal accounts of deliberation usually require very narrow de" ni-
tions of deliberation. Constitutional and procedural democrats such as Rawls or Dahl 
agree on the necessary conditions that have to be secured for public deliberation and 
participation to take place. Among them there are fundamental democratic institu-
tions, equal political liberty, publicity, and democratic values such as equal respect 
for fellow citizens, reciprocity et cetera. But they do not see it as necessary or desir-
able to extend democracy beyond procedural and constitutional institutions, and to 
allow the public fora of civil society to play a more important role in in# uencing the 
overall decision-making process by giving deliberation greater scope.  ey fail to 
notice, according to deliberative democrats, that creating more deliberative fora that 
bring previously excluded voices into politics is the best way to resolve con# ict and 
16 J. Habermas, Between Facts and Norms…, p. 298.
17 M. Warren, ‘  e Self in Discursive Democracy’, in: S.K. White (ed.), ! e Cambridge 
Companion to Habermas, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995, pp. 181–195.
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that “bringing people in” through deliberation is worthwhile as such. Among delib-
erative democrats, at least three approaches to deliberation can be distinguished: 
! rstly, a narrow, procedural or institution-centred approach that gives a purely formal 
account of deliberation perceiving it as an ideal procedure for justifying and legitimis-
ing the democratic process; secondly, a broader, non-proceduralist, and more 
practical approach that locates deliberation in speci! c arenas of civil society and the 
public sphere, and focuses on the practical question of how public deliberation works; 
and thirdly, the “deliberation within” approach which stresses the importance of 
individual deliberation that precedes public debate. " e last approach will not be 
discussed here. Su#  ce to say that “deliberation within” occurs before discussion and 
interaction with others: “it seems that informal, pre-group deliberation – ‘deliberation 
within’ – will inevitably do much of the work that deliberative democrats ordinarily 
want to attribute to the more formal discursive processes.18 A short discussion of the 
two main approaches to deliberation will illustrate that both approaches build upon 
the ideal of active citizenry. 
" e procedural approach is advocated by those deliberative democrats who search 
for an ideal procedure of democratic deliberation and focus their attention on the 
necessary conditions that need to be met for such a procedure to work. Some of them 
regard the institutions of the liberal state – constitutional assemblies, legislatures, 
juries, courts, and public hearings – as the most signi! cant venues for deliberation. 
For example, Habermas seems to perceive voting in elections as the main means by 
which the in$ uence of public opinion is converted into communicative power, which 
is then converted into administrative power through law-making. His discourse 
theory presents an ideal procedure for deliberation and decision-making. Discourse 
appears on the level of public opinion formation and it does not entail speci! c 
deliberative bodies. According to this view, practical reason resides “in the rules of 
discourse and forms of argumentation that borrow their normative content from the 
validity basis of action oriented to reaching understanding.”19 Similarly, Amy Gut-
mann and Dennis " ompson’s concept of deliberative democracy is concerned, above 
all, with the conditions that make deliberation in pluralistic and divided societies 
possible.20 " ey go beyond Rawls’s proceduralism and the solitary deliberation on 
the principles of justice, and beyond Habermas’s approach advocating the practice 
18 R. Goodin, J. Niemeyer, ‘When Does Deliberation Begin? Internal Re$ ection versus 
Public Discussion in Deliberative Democracy’, Political Studies 51(4), pp. 627–645. See also 
R. Goodin, Re! ective Democracy, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003, chap. 9
19 Habermas, Between Facts and Norms…, p. 297. Cf. Cohen, ‘Deliberation and Demo-
cratic Legitimacy’.
20 A. Gutmann, D. " ompson, Democracy and Disagreement, Cambridge MA: Harvard 
University Press, 1996.
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of developing conclusive moral reasons through public discussions, and emphasising 
the need for moral deliberation. Gutmann and ! ompson have no doubt that “by 
making democracy more deliberative, citizens stand a better chance of resolving 
some of their moral disagreements, and living with those that will inevitably persist, 
on terms that all can accept”, but at the same time they do not view citizens’ partici-
pation as desirable per se.21To Gutmann and ! ompson, participatory democracy 
seems analogous with direct democracy, and they conclude in their last book: 
“Democratically elected and accountable representatives of citizens may be better 
deliberators, and are likely to be democratically recognized as such”.22 But it seems 
that what matters is not only the content of deliberation, be it con" icting moral views 
or conceptions of the common good, and the adequate conditions for deliberation, 
but also its scope in terms of participants. Especially if deliberative reasoning based 
on the principle of reciprocity is supposed to encourage, as Gutmann and ! ompson 
wish, the cultivation of civic virtues that guide citizens in a pluralistic society.23 
! e second approach can have a number of variants. Democracy can become 
more deliberative if various associations are involved in the decision-making process 
[associative deliberative democracy].24 Deliberation can be located in speci$ c orga-
nizations and practices, among them civic and political organizations, it may involve 
courts and legislatures. Other examples are “deliberative opinion polls” and the 
practice of citizens’ juries, which provide the opportunity for a more active citizen-
ship.25 James Bohman develops a dialogical account of public deliberation de$ ned 
in a more participatory way as “a joint social activity involving all citizens” and as a 
“dialogical process of exchanging reasons for the purpose of resolving problematic 
situations that cannot be settled without interpersonal coordination and coopera-
tion.”26 Such cooperation-based deliberation is to provide a moral ground for demo-
cratic participation in complex societies. 
21 Ibid. p. 51.
22 A. Gutmann, D. ! omposn, Why Deliberative Democracy?, Princeton: Princeton Uni-
versity Press, 2004, p. 31.
23 Gutmann and ! ompson, Democracy and Disagreement, pp. 93-94.
24 See for example J. Cohen and J. Rogers (eds), Associations and Democracy. London: 
Verso, 1995. Cf. P. Hirst, Associative Democracy: New Forms of Economic and Social Govern-
ance. Cambridge: Polity Press, 1994, pp. 23-47.
25 J. S.Fishkin, Democracy and Deliberation, New Haven: Yale University Press, 1991, chap. 
8; J. S. Fishkin, ! e Voice of People, New Haven: Yale University Press, 1997; B. Ackerman 
and J. S. Fishkin, ‘Deliberation Day’, ! e Journal of Political Philosophy, 10 (2), 2002, pp. 129-
152; G. Smith, C. Wales, ‘Citizens’ Juries and Deliberative Democracy’, Political Studies 48 
(1), 2000, pp. 51-65.
26 J. Bohman, Public Deliberation, p. 17, 27.
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With both approaches, a truly deliberative democracy requires active and respon-
sible citizens’ involvement, at least in the public opinion formation, and thus it calls 
for an institutional design that would facilitate participation or at least for some 
transformation of existing institutions and practices in order to make them more 
responsive to and more suitable for deliberative practices. In this context, the concept 
of the public sphere and its institutions and practices seems to be especially pertinent. 
Yet the formal, procedural design as o! ered by deliberative democrats does not by 
itself solve the problem of how to encourage the practice of active citizenship. Such 
involvement can be seen as a civic duty (civic republicans) or as an opportunity to 
advance fairer democratic decision-making and to in" uence its outcomes (delibera-
tive democrats). # e ideal of deliberation demands the ability and readiness to discuss 
issues of common importance to citizens. In a participatory deliberative democracy 
people do have the opportunity to participate in various forms of deliberation and 
debate and thus to ful$ l their rights and duties as citizens, but they also perceive 
participation as worthwhile and bene$ cial to one’s well-being. Hence, it can be argued 
that even if public deliberation that involves and encourages civic participation is 
not su%  cient to bring about desirable political outcomes, it is necessary for a viable 
form of democracy 
THE PARTICIPATORY TURN 
AND THE PROBLEMATIC VALUE OF PARTICIPATION
Participatory democrats who are preoccupied with the erosion of democratic 
vitality in the “thin democracy” assert that democratic participation has an intrinsic 
value, and the central ideal of democratic politics they advocate is the active involve-
ment of citizens and achieving political consensus through dialogue.27 Participatory 
governance is supposed to involve reforms that “rely upon the commitment and 
capacities of ordinary people to make sensible decisions through reasoned delibera-
tion and empowered because they attempt to tie action to discussion.”.28 It is a project 
which combines the values of participation, deliberation, and empowerment.29 
“Strong democrats”, such as Benjamin Barber, emphasise that the liberal view of 
27 See especially, C. Pateman, Participation and Democratic ! eory, Cambridge: Cam-
bridge University Press, 1970; B. Barber, Strong Democracy…; C. B. Macpherson, Demo-
cratic ! eory: Essays in Retrieval, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1973; C. C. Gould, Re-
thinking Democracy: Freedom and Social Cooperation in Politics, Economy, and Society, Cam-
bridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988.
28 A. Fung and E. Olin Wright, ‘# inking about Empowered Participatory Governance’, 
in A. Fung and E.Olin Wright (eds), Deepening Democracy, London: Verso, 2003, pp. 3–45.
29 Ibid., p. 5.
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citizenship creates weak and privatize citizens whose role is con! ned to regular vot-
ing and making their preferences clear. Barber argues that “strong democratic 
political processes aim to strengthen the role of ‘citizen’ – to re-establish its sover-
eignty over other roles.”30
Deliberative democrats view participation as instrumental to political equality, 
and – in its educative function – to deliberation.31 On this reading, participation is 
not praised independently of these two values – equality and deliberation – but it has 
to be seen as a practice that facilitates achieving of these values. On the other hand, 
deliberative democrats value participation because it develops individuals’ capacity 
for practical reasoning and judgement as well as mutual respect that is necessary for 
any discursive practice. In a democracy, individuals are equal as citizens and this role 
gives them the sense of common political identity. " rough participation, they become 
aware not only of the diversity of preferences and reasons, but also of the democratic 
principles they comply with and of equality that follows. " is empowerment brings 
about trust in democratic institutions and practices and develops positive attitudes 
towards politics. Citizenship understood in terms of participation in democratic 
deliberative practices contributes to the vision of politics as an activity open to the 
di# ering and con$ icting views of citizens. " is meaning of politics has republican 
roots, but can also be applied to participatory deliberative democracy.32 In a sense, it 
is the only concept of politics that explicitly addresses participation as an intrinsic 
value. It presupposes that only through active participation the orientation towards 
truly public interest can be developed. Deliberative process requires that people make 
the e# ort to think and to express their opinions and judgements publicly, and that 
they want to enter a dialogue with others. Consequently, deliberation can be seen as 
rewarding not only because it makes decisions more legitimate, but also because it 
gives the opportunity for the practice of citizenship. 
Such a conclusion might be obvious to participatory democrats or those in$ u-
enced by civic republicanism, but not necessarily to deliberative democrats. Although 
it seems evident that the concept of deliberative democracy presupposes some form 
of citizens’ participation in the democratic process of decision-making, it is unclear 
how broad in scope such participation should be. " eorists of deliberation are quick 
30 Strong Democracy, p. 208.
31 J. Fishkin, Democracy and Deliberation, p. 53. See also T. Christiano, ! e Rule of the Many: 
Fundamental Issues in Democratic ! eory, Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1996, p. 41.
32 In a participatory democracy politics becomes a discursive activity that has an educa-
tive character and is associated with active citizenship. In a liberal democracy the meaning 
of politics is usually con! ned to the arena of con$ ict, power, strategy, and interests, and it is 
an allocative or economic kind of activity concerned with the e%  cient delivery of govern-
mental goods and services. 
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to specify what conditions would facilitate democratic deliberation, but they overlook 
the question of how active citizenry could be advanced and encouraged. Yet for the 
representative form of government to become more “discursive”, it must involve 
citizens’ participation in the decision-making process or at least some in! uence on 
that process by those who are subject to decisions. If decisions are made in the last 
resort by representatives, the role of citizens’ deliberation would be to come to terms 
with con! icting views and reasons and thus to facilitate the decision-making process 
undertaken a" er the results of deliberation are known. Such a framework would 
combine both deliberative participation and representation. 
Consequently, on the conceptual level it seems that the three normative models 
of democracy – deliberative, participatory, and republican – despite some important 
di# erences between them,33 share the ideal of democratic participation as a desirable 
and indispensable component of the democratic process. But if so the question about 
the scope and the locus of citizens’ involvement in a deliberative democracy has to 
be posed. John Dryzek’s version of deliberative democracy di# ers from many other 
similar visions due to his preoccupation with the participatory aspect of democracy. 
He views deliberative democracy as a theory of democratic legitimacy that depends 
on the ability of those who are subject to a decision to participate in “authentic 
deliberation.”34  is kind of participation takes place not only within the state where 
it involves the institutions of the liberal state, but also, and more importantly, in the 
public sphere and civil society. I believe that this claim can be strengthened with a 
more substantive and citizenship-centred conception of civil society than the one 
that is usually taken for granted by advocates of liberal democracy.  e idea of civil 
society understood as the network of nongovernmental associations and various 
forms of public activity that bring people together has a civic dimension that concerns 
the role of the individual as a citizen. It is a sphere where free persons act not only 
as private individuals, but also as citizens who associate with others in order to 
achieve some common goals, to articulate public will, and to converse about imme-
diate common concerns.  erefore, as long as the practices within civil society do 
not violate democratic principles the model of deliberative democracy is based on, 
it can be seen as a broad and diverse forum for deliberation that guides public policy 
and the practice of active citizenship. It can constitute a better site for democratiza-
tion than the state. As such, it requires education to citizenship and the development 
33  e language of civic duty is absent from the theory of deliberative democracy. Rath-
er, participation in deliberation is perceived as a desirable way to protect our freedom and 
equality as citizens and to make use of our capacity for public reasoning. 
34 J. Dryzek, Deliberative Democracy and Beyond, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000, 
p. 85.
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of speci c attitudes in citizens, such as responsiveness and accountability to others. 
It also requires a robust public culture and a  ourishing public sphere that make 
participants conscious of themselves as a public, as well as institutions that sustain 
citizens’ engagement in a public dialogue. If that dialogue aims at agreement about 
what constitutes the public good, then the opportunity to take part in deliberation 
must be widespread. It means that citizens must be provided with opportunities to 
advance some common goals with others through channels of communication. 
 e crucial practical question for deliberative democrats is how to make the 
practice of citizenship work, how to encourage people to think that responsible 
citizenship enhances their chance of well-being and opens new opportunities to them 
as members of the polity. Deliberative democracy is inclusive in the sense that it 
creates a space for debate for citizens whose views and goals might di$ er signi cantly, 
but who want to uphold a cooperative democratic framework. It allows those views 
to be expressed in the public forum where everyone has a say.  e existence of that 
very forum is a necessary condition for discursive practices. “Deliberation within”, 
as argued by Robert Goodin, is important, but as such does not a$ ect any political 
development as long as its results are not expressed publicly.35  e main problem for 
deliberative democracy, then, is how to encourage the development of a wider, rather 
than purely formal, sense of citizenship, and how to encourage the practice of this 
kind of citizenship. As I will try to illustrate in the last section, the practice of citizen-
ship might be more essential than reaching an agreement through the medium of 
that practice, although from the deliberative perspective participation is not valuable 
in itself, but rather is seen as a good side-e$ ect of deliberative politics. What matters 
is that deliberation based on the principles of reciprocity, publicity, and equality of 
arguments allows citizens to understand di$ erences and to search for reasonable 
consensus or at least mutual understanding. Public debate is the method of seeking 
out principles that di$ ering parties share or can agree upon. In contrast, participatory 
and republican democrats would value participation because it develops signi cant 
moral qualities in citizens, such as self-development, respect for others, and respon-
sibility, and it also increases their sense of identity and autonomy.36  is disagreement, 
however, disappears on a more general level, for as the above analysis aimed to 
demonstrate, both approaches to democracy should be understood as based on the 
ideal of responsible civic involvement of the governed. If this assumption is true, 
both deliberative and participatory democrats have to face a similar problem of 
35 R. Goodin, Re! ective Democracy, chap. 9.
36 Cf. C. Sunstein, " e Partial Constitution, Cambridge MA.: Harvard University Press, 
1991, p. 135.
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feasibility of their models in terms of making the practice of active citizenship work.37 
Can the model of deliberative participatory democracy be attractive despite the fact 
that the ideal of widespread participation seems to be unattainable in contemporary 
democracies? In the next section I will try to address this question with a reference 
to a speci c democratic context – that of post-communist democracies. 
PARTICIPATORY DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY 
AND THE POST-COMMUNIST CONTEXT
" ere is no doubt that the institutional con guration of a deliberative participa-
tory model depends on the speci c limitations and opportunities of the particular 
social and political context, and especially on the cultural traditions to which par-
ticipants of deliberation subscribe, as well as on the capabilities and preferences of 
the actors of deliberation.38 To some extent, deliberative democracy could be described 
as “context-sensitive”. " e question that I should like to address in this last section 
is whether the model of participatory deliberative democracy could be attractive 
from the perspective of East-Central European democratization. 
" e di# erences between ECE democracies and old well-established western 
democracies are usually explained in terms of democratic political stability and 
accountability, with emphasis on the role of democratic culture and a robust civil 
society. Post-communist democracies in comparison to most western democracies 
are less e# ective, less accountable, and are in the process of developing democratic 
political and legal cultures and civil societies. It can be argued that these di# erences 
are major obstacles to the development of deliberative politics in those democracies. 
In particular, the lack of a $ ourishing civil society and public sphere may be perceived 
as the main impediment to a broader, civil society-centred model of deliberation. 
" is situation, however, can be tackled from a di# erent perspective: discursive 
practices that involve the active participation of citizens can be viewed as a desirable 
way to the development of a robust civil society and democratic culture in ECE 
countries. " e  rst step in this direction was undertaken in the 1980s by anticom-
munist associations of the democratic opposition – which might be viewed as an 
example of deliberative bodies – as open, public associations of citizens who shared 
common concerns about the future of their polity and the disa# ection with their 
leaders and the imposed political, legal, and economic structures. Today the par-
37 R. J. Dalton, W. Bürklin, and A. Drummond, ‘Public Opinion and Direct Democracy’, 
Journal of Democracy, 2001, 12 (4), pp. 141–153.
38 J. Dryzek, Discursive Democracy, p. 41.
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ticipatory, civil-society centred model might revitalize and strengthen democracy 
in these countries, making it less procedural and more substantive.
Another reason for advocating a deliberative participatory turn in the post-com-
munist context is the problem of legitimacy which is crucial to democratic stability. 
Alienated political life and pseudorepresentation undermine democratic legitimacy. 
As Phillip Green has noticed,
what is nondemocratic about all forms of pseudorepresentative government – 
whether unitary or federalist, whether based on centralized or fragmented political 
parties…is that it turns political access and in! uence into an episodic and occasional 
or even nonexistent event in the lives of most people.39.
" e model of deliberative democracy brings the problem of democratic legitimacy 
to the fore, and it is the question of legitimacy, not participation, that provokes the 
arguments of its proponents.40 Deliberative democracy is a better model than “aggre-
gative” or elitist democracy because it values public deliberation as a method of 
attaining legitimacy and holding political power to account. In participatory delib-
erative democracy, legitimacy derives from citizens’ participation, their practice of 
citizenship. Democratic legitimacy and trust in authority is generated through dis-
cursive practices which are themselves a necessary source of justi$ cation for politi-
cal decisions.41 " e institutions’ trustworthiness generates positive attitudes towards 
them among citizens who are therefore more likely to comply with them.42 It is worth 
exploring whether increased participation in discursive practices in post-communist 
countries would increase support for democratic principles and institutions and 
therefore would make them more legitimate. Admittedly, the obvious problem is that 
the scope and the number of decisions that have to be made in a democratic polity 
limit the scope of deliberation and thus participation, which is more likely to bring 
better results at a local or associational level. Another problem, widely discussed by 
Gutmann and " ompson, is the potential for disagreement concerning policies on 
controversial moral issues. Here a widespread debate can become polarized without 
39 P. Green, Retrieving Democracy: In Search of Civic Equality, London: Methuen, 1985, 
p. 179.
40 B. Manin, ‘On Legitimacy and Political Deliberation’, Political ! eory, 1987, 15 (3), pp. 
338-368; J. Cohen, ‘Deliberation and Democratic Legitimacy’; S. Benhabib, ‘Toward a Delib-
erative Model of Democratic Legitimacy’, in S. Benhabib (ed.), Democracy and Di" erence, 
Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996.
41 " is view is based on a concept of a “strong public” as opposed to Habermas’s “weak 
public” understood as the vehicle of public opinion. 
42 N. Letki, ‘Investigating the Roots of Civic Morality: Trust, Civic Community, and In-
stitutional Performance’, Nu#  eld College Working Paper in Politics, 2003-WP13; M. E. Warren 
(ed.), Democracy and Trust, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999.
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leading to some middle-ground solution or compromise. Despite these di!  culties, 
it can be said that a" er the period of the communist oppression the model of delib-
erative democracy seems to be ideal for the countries whose citizens regained 
freedom to shape the future of their political communities; their voice should be 
heard especially at di erent stages of democratization when the institutional frame-
work that a ects various spheres of their lives is shaped.  is conclusion, which is 
not obvious in itself, cannot be put forward without  rst addressing the question of 
the feasibility of such a development. 
 e main goal of post-communist countries at the beginning of their political 
and economic transformations was to create liberal and democratic institutions, such 
as the division of power, the rule of law, free and fair elections, democratic account-
ability, freedom of association, free media, and constitutionally guaranteed civil and 
political rights.  is process was not in uenced by a participatory concept of demo-
cratic politics, and some authors argued that, a er the collapse of communism, a 
mild form of authoritarianism based on a strong executive along with a free-market 
economy would provide a stability that is necessary for the further implementation 
of western type liberal-democratic institutions and procedures. For example, John 
Gray concluded that “post-Communist states should build institutions that constrain 
democracy rather than to exalt it.”43 Contrary to this view, those ECE countries which 
became leaders of democratic transformation and consequently members of the EU 
undertook simultaneous liberalization and democratization, creating western type 
liberal-democratic institutions and achieving a relatively high level of democratic 
stability. What Gray might have had in mind while formulating his conclusion was 
perhaps a concern that too radical a democratic model based on widespread par-
ticipation of citizens in the decision-making process would not be desirable in the 
countries, which had not had much experience with democracy and liberal political 
culture. If so, such standpoint would pose another dilemma for deliberative demo-
crats: are citizens of well-established democracies better prepared and thus more 
willing to actively participate in various deliberative practices than citizens of post-
communist democracies?  ere is no doubt that consolidated democracy must come 
 rst, but what might happen once it has been established?
In their recent book based on the  ndings of the World Values Surveys, Ronald 
Inglehart and Christian Welzel provide reasons for the observation that society’s 
mass values have a strong e ect on its subsequent democratic performance; there is 
43 J. Gray, ‘Totalitarianism, Civil Society, and the Limits of the Western Model’, in J. Gray, 
Post-liberalism: Studies in Political  ought, New York and London: Routledge, 1993, p. 213.
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a casual link between democratic values and democratic institutions.44 “Cultural 
factors shape levels of democracy more strongly than democratic institutions shape 
culture.”45 ! is would imply that the cultural approach to democratization provides 
a good explanation for the link between successful democratization and the back-
ground social and cultural conditions of a given society. If, however, prodemocratic 
values are conducive to e" ective democracy and active participation, and they pre-
suppose successful democratization rather than result from it, the question which 
needs to be addressed is this: what are the chances of democratic consolidation and 
the development of # ourishing civil societies in those countries where democratic 
institutions have been introduced despite the lack of democratic culture and socio-
economic development? If the sequence suggest by Inglehart and Welzel – socioeco-
nomic modernization, value change, and then democratic institutions – has been 
distorted, does it mean that the reversal of this cycle would not result in e" ective 
democracy in the long term? If participation is strongly associated with human 
development and abilities to “make decisions and actions based on autonomous 
choices”46, the establishment of liberal-democratic institutions in ECE countries 
might be enough to provide political and economic stability, but they are not likely 
to become participatory-deliberative democracies in the near future. 
In Hungary and Poland new political party leaders tacitly agreed at the beginning 
of the democratic transformation that “the politics of participation was only a mat-
ter of yesterday.” 47Paradoxically, although the road to democracy in these and other 
post-communist countries was paved by the development of a rich associational life, 
the dominance of party politics subsequently undermined the role of the public 
sphere and public discussion in shaping democratic outcomes, and discouraged 
citizens from taking part in the public debate. ! e model of democracy that was to 
be built was democratic elitism, a model that does not require widespread participa-
tion and robust civil society for democracy to succeed. ! e level of participation in 
both politics and civil society is much lower in post-communist countries than in 
older democracies and post-authoritarian state.48 As a consequence, politics was 
44 R. Inglehart, C. Welzel, Modernization, Cultural Change, and Democracy: Human De-
velopment Sequence, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005.
45 Ibid, p. 177.
46 Ibid, p. 47.
47 A. Arato, Civil Society, Constitution, and Legitimacy, Lanham: Rowman and Little$ eld, 
2000, p. 67.
48 According to the World Value Survey 1995–1997, older democracies (such as USA, 
Australia, Sweden or Switzerland) participation in civil society mean was 2.39, post-au-
thoritarian mean 1.82, and post-communist mean 0.91. See M. Morjé Howard,‘! e Weakness 
of Postcommunist Civil Society’, Journal of Democracy, 2002, 13 (1), pp. 157–169; A. Smolar, 
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isolated from societal inputs. ECE democracies su! er from an increasing absence of 
demos or citizens willing to take part in the political process. For example, in Poland, 
which might be said to have achieved a high level of democratic consolidation, the 
turn out in the last parliamentary election in September 2005 was 40.57 percent. 
Commentators observe that many people in ECE are disappointed and disillusioned 
with the transformation.49 Arguably, it is not so much dissatisfaction with the trans-
formation, but rather with the type of democracy that has been introduced in these 
countries. If, however, we take into consideration the cultural approach to democ-
ratization as provided by Inglehart and Welzel, the main reason for low participation 
in democratic politics in post-communist democracies could well be an insu"  cient 
level of pro-democratic, self-expression values (conducive for trust and social capi-
tal) in society, which itself might be responsible for the overall disa! ection with 
democratic transformation. 71% of Czechs, 81% of Slovaks, and 81% of Poles do not 
trust political parties (the highest level of trust for political parties is in Hungary – 
29%). Similarly, 82% of Poles, 74% of Slovaks, and 71% of Czechs do not trust their 
MPs.50 If East European citizens do not associate their citizenship with participation, 
o# en it is not so much because there are not many opportunities to participate, but 
because the people’s attitudes are in$ uenced by the belief that activity can make 
little or no di! erence. 
It seems, from the above analysis, that at present the question of the feasibility of 
a more participatory-deliberative model of democracy in ECE post-communist 
countries can only be answered in the negative. Participatory-deliberative democracy 
requires the creation of conditions which allow ordinary citizens to exercise their 
capacity of critical judgement about questions of great importance to them. What 
has been absent in former communist countries is a democratic culture and demo-
cratic traditions (although some of these countries had some experience with 
democracy before the communist period), but it can be argued that in the post-com-
munist context they can only be developed through the practice of democracy on 
many di! erent levels. Yet widespread participation in itself is not going to solve all 
the problems; more deliberative forms of democracy can be successful in those 
societies which are not riddled by di! erence, ethnic divisions, and thus cultural and 
religious complexity. In a divided society, deliberation can bring the di! erences to 
the surface and widen the existing divisions rather than make them narrower. 
‘Civil Society a# er Communism: From Opposition to Atomization, Journal of Democracy, 
1996, 7 (1), pp. 24-38.
49 J. Curry, ‘& e Sociological Legacies of Communism’, in Z. Barany and I. Volgyes (eds), 
! e Legacies of Communism in Eastern Europe, Baltimore and London: & e John Hopkins 
University Press, pp. 55–83.
50 CBOS (2004), BS/165/2004.
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Democratic deliberation, as I emphasised above, does not appear in an empty space, 
but in an already existing normative framework. In ECE, however, the situation is a 
little bit more complicated, for as Ahg rightly notes, “consensus on fundamental 
values or ‘civic culture’ cannot be a precondition for systematic change, nor even of 
democratic transition; rather, it is the result of a process.”51 And although deliberative 
politics would be desirable in those countries not only a! er the goals of transforma-
tion have been achieved, but also during that process, the pattern of non-participa-
tion might prevail in the near future which would hinder such a development.
" e main objections to this optimistic reading of the new possibilities for ECE 
democracies are empirical, but there is also empirical support for the participatory 
deliberative conception of democracy as being worthwhile. John Dryzek and Leslie 
Holmes in their empirical study of post-communist democratization identify both 
republican and participatory democratic discourses in some of the most advanced 
post-communist democracies (mainly the Czech Republic, Poland, and Slovakia) 
and they conclude that the republican path in these countries “would seek both 
formal (state) and informal (public sphere) opportunities for the exercise and devel-
opment of active citizenship … Networks of civic engagement are treated as more 
important than party systems and interest groups.”52 " is optimistic reading of the 
course of democratic changes in ECE provides good grounds at least for the discus-
sion about the goals of the transformation and about desirable models of post-com-
munist democracy. 
CONCLUSION
" is article argues that deliberative democracy not only demands citizens’ par-
ticipation in various deliberative fora and debates on public issues, but it also demands 
moral and cognitive competence of citizens, the ability to formulate and change 
preferences and arguments, and to accept reasons given by others. Proper deliberation 
also requires that citizens have the disposition to further public over private good.53 
51 A. Agh, ‘Political Culture and System Change in Hungary’, in F. Plasser, A. Pribersky, 
Political Culture in East Central Europe, Aldershot: Avebury, 1996, p. 127.
52 J. Dryzek, L. Holmes, Post-Communist Democratization: Political Discourses across 
! irteen Countries, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002, p. 270.
53 On various aspects of citizens’ involvement in democratic politics see S. Verba, ‘Rep-
resentative Democracy and Democratic Citizens: Philosophical and Empirical Understand-
ing’, ! e Tanner Lectures on Human Values 21, Salt Lake City: " e University of Utah Press, 
2000, pp. 246–275.
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  e criteria that authentic deliberation should maintain are extremely high. Yet by 
arguing in favour of a more participatory model of deliberative democracy I tried to 
emphasise that active citizenship and participation can have intrinsic value even if 
they do not bring about agreement and even if people who participate do not have a 
high cognitive competence, and are not always capable of formulating reasons in a 
rational way. Active citizenship and deliberation can be seen as the way to revitalize 
democracy and to restore trust in political institutions both in the Western and East-
ern contexts. But without citizens’ participation in democratic processes and various 
fora of public deliberation and opinion formation, none of these can be achieved.  e 
high level of distrust of political parties and members of parliaments in post-com-
munist democracies indicates that neither parliaments nor political parties perform 
well their role as venues of democratic deliberation.  e model of participatory 
deliberative democracy should result in better accountability of those in government 
and in a more responsible decision-making process. At the moment, however, the 
feasibility of such a model in the post-communist context is problematic. 
 
